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August, 2009
I. EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION The Statute Of Limitations for Filing a Claim Under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination is Not Tolled by the Filing of an Administrative Claim In Omogbehin v. Dimensions International, Inc., 2009 WL 2222927 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009), an unpublished opinion, plaintiff, Stephen Omogbehin, a Nigerian-born African male, was employed by Defendant, Flight Dimensions International, Inc. d/b/a Flight Explorer ("Flight Dimensions"), for approximately six months before being terminated on May 24, 2006. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant alleging that his termination was motivated by discrimination based on race and national origin in violation of both Title VII and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"). Additionally, Plaintiff alleged that his termination was in retaliation for an Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") claim he filed against a previous employer in violation of Title VII. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint arguing, among other things, that all of plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because they are time-barred. The court agreed. Claims under the NJLAD are governed by a two-year statute of limitations. The court noted that a limitations period is triggered when an employer establishes its official position and makes that position apparent to the employee by explicit notice. In the instant case, plaintiff received notice of his termination on May 24, 2006. Termination of plaintiff's employment was effective immediately and, as a result, his cause of action accrued no later than May 24, 2006. Plaintiff did not file his Complaint, however, until August 6, 2008. The 805 days between plaintiff's termination and the filing of the Complaint exceeded the two year statute of limitations. As such, the court found that plaintiff's NJLAD claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff disputed that his state claims are time-barred arguing that he filed an administrative claim with the EEOC on August 16, 2006, which was within the two-year limitations period. He asserted that he was informed by the EEOC that his claims would be filed as both a state and federal charge. Therefore, plaintiff argued that the filing of his administrative complaint means that his NJLAD claims were timely filed. The court found this argument unavailing noting that unlike Title VII, the NJLAD does not require the claimant to seek an administrative remedy before proceeding with a judicial remedy for his claims. While a plaintiff may elect to seek redress administratively instead of, or prior to, seeking judicial redress, the statute of limitations for filing judicial claims is not tolled by the filing of an administrative claim. As the statute of limitations for making a judicial claim is the same regardless of whether or not an administrative charge was made, Plaintiff is barred from proceeding with an action filed outside the period of limitations. Plaintiff's claim was not made until this suit was filed on August 6, 2008, past the two-year statute of limitations, and his NJLAD claims were therefore barred. II. ERISA LITIGATION ERISA Pre-Empts A Breach of Contract Claim Seeking Benefits Under An Employer-Sponsored Group Life insurance Policy In Shephard v. AETNA Life Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2448548 (E.D. Pa. August 7, 2009)(Slip opinion), plaintiffs, Tammy L. Shephard and Lorri A. Hendrikse, sought benefits under a policy issued by AETNA Life Insurance Company. Before the District Court was Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. The District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, and denied Plaintiffs' Motion. Plaintiffs were the children of decedent William Hendrickse, a former employee of Monet Graphics, Inc. Monet Graphics took out a policy of group life insurance through Defendant AETNA, which policy was intended to cover all eligible employees of Monet Graphics, beginning on July 1, 2004. Mr. Hendrickse died in April 2008. Plaintiffs were the named beneficiaries of decedent under the policy. Upon decedent's death, Plaintiffs filed a claim for benefits with Defendant AETNA, which benefits were valued at approximately $9,750.00. Defendant AETNA denied the claim. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint with the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, asserting a state law claim for breach of contract. The complaint alleged that Monet Graphics paid premiums on the group policy of life insurance issued by AETNA, covering all employees, including decedent, from July 1, 2004 through to the time of decedent's death in April 2008. Defendant removed the matter to federal Court, and filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, claiming the state law claims were pre-empted by ERISA. Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, but failed to file opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. In granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, the Court found that "ERISA expressly preempts any and all State laws insofar as they may . . . relate to any employee benefit plan." The District Court also noted that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has specifically held that breach of contract claims arising out of a failure to provide employee benefits under a group insurance policy are preempted by ERISA." With regard to Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, seeking to bring a cause of action under ERISA, the Court noted that ERISA requires an exhaustion of all administrative remedies before such a claim can be brought, and the failure to exhaust all such administrative remedies would constitute grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Accordingly, in denying Plaintiffs' Motion, the Court found allowing leave to amend would be futile, as Plaintiffs had failed to plead that all administrative remedies had been exhausted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed, as pre-empted by ERISA. Copies of the full text of any of the cases discussed in this Newsletter may be
obtained by calling our office. The articles contained in this Newsletter
are for informational purposes only and do not constitute legal advice.
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